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PROPRIETARY TRADING:  
OF SCOURGES, SCAPEGOATS, AND SCOFFLAWS 
Onnig H. Dombalagian* 
Perhaps it is just the lure of alliteration, but one cannot help but hear 
echoes of the Volstead Act1 in the Volcker Rule.2  The excesses and 
perceived calamitous consequences of public drunkenness in the early 
twentieth century were viewed with such opprobrium that critics 
persuaded legislators that only outright prohibition, rather than 
responsive regulation, could cure social decay.3  The United States 
quickly became a “nation of scofflaws,”4 however, as activity migrated 
from regulated manufacturers, distributors and dealers to clandestine 
facilities, and well-placed dealers (and their legislative and regulatory 
lackeys) found ways to skirt enforcement.5  The consequences of such 
unregulated activity—both to the health of consumers and public 
safety—became so apparent that repeal was the only option.6  A well-
meaning, but short-sighted, experiment ended with little to show but the 
shame of hypocrisy and the scars of lost productivity.7 
Prohibition aptly captures the tension between the expressive 
significance of the Volcker Rule (the Rule) and the impracticability of 
its implementation.8  The highly profitable, yet risky trading activity of 
 
 * George Denègre Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.  I would like to thank Professor 
Barbara Black and the University of Cincinnati Corporate Law Center for the invitation to participate in 
the Center’s 25th Annual Symposium, as well as my fellow contributors, presenters, and participants for 
their thoughtful and helpful comments.  I would also like to thank Matthew Amoss for his outstanding 
research assistance in connection with this project.  All errors are mine. 
 1. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat.  305 (1919) [hereinafter Volstead 
Act], repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, 49 Stat. 872 (1935). 
 2. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2010)).  Throughout this 
Article, I will refer to Section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act as the “Volcker Rule” or the “Rule.” 
 3. See generally EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 
(Arcade Publ’g, 1996). 
 4. See Prohibition: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick (PBS 2011), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/.  According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word 
“scofflaw” was the winning entry in a contest to create a word to characterize the “lawless drinker” of 
illegally made or illegally obtained liquor.  Scofflaw, THE BIG APPLE (Dec. 28, 2004), 
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/scofflaw/. 
 5. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 17–19 (Kent State Univ. Press, 2d 
ed. 2000). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; BEHR, supra note 3, at 221, 234–36. 
 7. See Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day, July 14, 1939 (“Little by little it dawned upon me that this 
law was not making people drink any less, but it was making hypocrites and law breakers of a great 
number of people.”) (syndicated column), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/eleanor-my-day/. 
 8. The Rule provides for coordinated rulemaking and enforcement by the following federal 
1
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commercial and investment banking groups represented the moral 
failures of the financial community, if not the root cause of the crisis.9  
Proprietary trading by banks and their affiliates ostensibly flouted the 
moral hazard created by the federal guarantee of fiscal assistance for the 
benefit of firms “too big” or “too interconnected to fail.”10  Moreover, 
the conflicting interests entailed in proprietary trading created a risk that 
financial services providers might profit at the expense of clients and 
counterparties who put faith in their advice and discretion.11 
The Volcker Rule was designed to strike a compromise between 
reestablishing the firewall between investment and commercial banking 
activities under the Glass–Steagall Act and retaining the synergistic 
benefits of bundling such services championed by the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act.12  In sum, the rule prohibits federally insured banks and all 
of their affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading, except when 
performing certain socially valuable, “client-oriented” services13—such 
as underwriting, market making, securitization, government securities 
dealing, and asset management—but only to the extent that such 
activities do not pose material conflicts, result in exposure to high-risk 
assets or trading strategies, pose a threat to safety and soundness, or 
 
financial regulators: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (FRB or the Board), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, and 
collectively, the Agencies). 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i) (2010). 
 9. GRP. OF 30, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 24–26 (2009), 
available at http://www.group30.org/rpt_03.shtml; Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed 
Volcker Rule 25 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 106, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990472; Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial 
Markets 41 n.10 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-19, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856633; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMMISSION REPORT 65–66 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at 
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu. 
 10. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9 (2010). 
 11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-529, PROPRIETARY TRADING: REGULATORS 
WILL NEED MORE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO FULLY MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH NEW 
RESTRICTIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTED 10–13 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Proprietary Trading Study]. 
 12. See David Weidner, The Innocents of 1933; Today’s Financial Overhaul Only Underscores 
the Impact of Depression-Era Laws, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 5, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704017904575409334043400658.html.  
 13. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 538-39 
(2011).  Trading activity may be considered “socially valuable” to the extent that it has positive 
spillover effects, such as improving the allocative efficiency of capital markets and the informational 
efficiency of trading markets.  See, e.g., Letter from Paul A. Volcker to the Dep’t of the Treasury et al., 
Attachment at 1, 5 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: 
OCC-2011-0014-0209); see also CHAIRPERSON OF THE FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY OF 
THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit 
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 (2011). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/1
2012] PROPRIETARY TRADING 389 
otherwise threaten the financial stability of the United States.  However 
clear the spirit of the Rule, the mechanics were left for regulators to 
devise, and commentators both supportive of and opposed to the policy 
behind the Rule have voiced their concerns in the course of its 
implementation.14 
Given the open-ended nature of the Rule and the considerable nuance 
of the first iteration of proposed rulemaking,15 the punditocracy cannot 
agree whether the Rule is a “bloated and weak” monstrosity that is “as 
good as dead,”16 or whether it restores the “old dividing line” as if it 
were Glass–Steagall reincarnated.17  Even as some regulators have 
hinted at additional rounds of rulemaking,18 the financial services 
industry appears to be taking the Rule quite seriously.  Several banking 
groups have publicly discussed the possibility of closing down or 
spinning off their investment banking operations,19 whereas others have 
moved their trading desks into asset management divisions.20  
Meanwhile, some prominent traders at commercial banking groups have 
abandoned their posts to go “in house” or to start up private funds.21  
Such moves could herald a new, more opaque marketplace, as markets 
 
 14. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer:” The Sausage-Making of 
Financial Reform 22–24 (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431. 
 15. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg.  68846, 68849 (Nov. 7, 2011) 
[hereinafter Joint Proposing Release] (notice of proposed rulemaking under Section 619 of the Dodd–
Frank Act); see also Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332 (Feb. 14, 2012).  The CFTC 
published a separate proposing release, in which it adopted the commentary of the Proposing Release in 
full and made only agency-specific changes to the text of the published rule.  Id. at 8332. 
 16. Jesse Eisinger, The Volcker Rule, Made Bloated and Weak, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 22, 
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/the-volcker-rule-made-bloated-and-weak/. 
 17. Steven M. Davidoff, Under Volcker, Old Dividing Line in Banks May Return, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 21, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/under-volcker-old-dividing-line-
in-banks-may-return/. 
 18. Compare Sarah N. Lynch, US SEC’s Paredes Calls for New Volcker Rule Draft, REUTERS 
(Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/sec-volcker-idUSL2E8DO9SS20120224, 
with Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, Progress Is Seen in Advancing a Final Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (May 2, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/progress-is-seen-in-advancing-a-
final-volcker-rule (suggesting that implementation is “on track for completion sooner than some bankers 
had expected”). 
 19. See, e.g., Michael J. Moore, Morgan Stanley Said to Consider Commodities Unit Sale, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-06/morgan-stanley-said-
to-consider-commodities-unit-sale.html; Dawn Kopecki & Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, JPMorgan Said to 
End Proprietary Trading to Meet Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-31/jpmorgan-is-said-to-shut-proprietary-trading-to-comply-
with-volcker-rule.html. 
 20. Tommy Wilkes, Banks Move High Risk Traders Ahead of U.S. Rule, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-volckerrule-trading-idUSBRE8320GS20120403. 
 21. See Halah Touryalai, Volcker Rule Refugees, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/03/21/volcker-rule-refugees/. 
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become more dependent on lightly regulated trading systems or other 
market speakeasies where hedge funds and professional traders provide 
liquidity outside the direct oversight of regulators. 
This Article will approach the topic from the perspective of regulators 
who must grapple with the Volcker Rule’s implementation.  On the one 
hand, the financial community can be expected squarely to resist any 
aggressive attempt to implement the Rule—perhaps in the expectation 
of a shift in executive and legislative policy—or at least to ensure there 
are enough loopholes to permit some proprietary trading to flourish.22  
On the other hand, failure to adopt a set of rules and an associated 
supervisory, compliance, and enforcement program would almost surely 
result in regulators taking significant heat if the Rule does not at least 
have some impact on the configuration of Wall Street’s activities or the 
internal organization of financial conglomerates, particularly if another 
crisis were to follow.23  Moreover, such efforts must be implemented in 
a manner that complements (without itself exacerbating the 
consequences of) other initiatives mandated by Dodd–Frank, many of 
which themselves may cramp the profitability of banking organizations 
and other nonbank financial companies.24 
The regulators have, on the recommendation of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council,25 staked out a three-pronged approach: (1) 
formalizing the classification of trading activities on the basis of existing 
account structures, (2) adopting quantitative measures for monitoring 
anomalous trading activity, and (3) mandating a system of internal 
controls that provides a roadmap for regulatory compliance, supervision, 
and enforcement.26  The Proposed Rulemaking leaves considerable 
 
 22. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Gillian Tett, Goldman President Warns on Bank Rules, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9753506-2990-11e0-bb9b-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1yUbVmM9q. 
 23. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Jeff Merkley and Sen. Carl Levin to the Agencies 1 (May 17, 
2012) [hereinafter Merkley & Levin Letter], available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using 
document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0427) (“The massive failed bet by JPMorgan Chase provides a stark 
reminder why we desperately need your agencies to implement the Volcker Rule—a modern Glass–
Steagall firewall that separates our core banking system from high-risk, hedge fund-style proprietary 
trading.”). 
 24. Throughout this Article, “banking organizations” refers to entities organized as bank holding 
companies (BHCs) or financial holding companies (FHCs) under the Bank Holding Company Act 
(BHCA) by virtue of their affiliation with a FDIC-insured depository institution.  See Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2011).  Likewise, “nonbank financial companies” (NFCs) 
refers to investment banks, insurance companies, private funds, and other companies predominantly 
engaged in financial activities that are not BHCs or FHCs.  Cf. Dodd–Frank Act § 102(a)(4) (defining 
“nonbank financial company”). 
 25. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON 
PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
31–32 (2011) [hereinafter FSOC Study]. 
 26. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68849. 
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ambiguity for regulators—and thus discretion for firms—in determining 
when activity constitutes proprietary trading and what the consequences 
of such trading will be.  For example, quantitative measures of risk, 
revenue, revenue relative to risk, and customer-facing activity could 
either result in excessive restrictions on activity or little to no restriction 
at all, depending upon how much discretion regulators retain (or require 
compliance personnel to exercise).  Moreover, as discussed below, 
fragmented jurisdiction over banking affiliates and differing regulatory 
attitudes and supervisory resources create a palpable risk of unequal 
enforcement. 
Part I of this Article considers the arguments made for and against the 
limitation or regulation of proprietary trading, with a particular (if not 
exclusive) focus on banking entities and other financial intermediaries.  
Part II describes the structure of the Volcker Rule, while Part III 
concentrates on its implementation by the federal banking and financial 
regulators, and the questions raised by commenters (and by the 
regulators themselves) on the effectiveness of the proposed rules.  Part 
IV offers some concluding remarks on how regulators might advance 
the moral imperative of the Rule by reorienting the proposed rules to 
complement other areas of Dodd–Frank rulemaking. 
I. PROPRIETARY TRADING: SCOURGE OR SCAPEGOAT? 
How one defends the prohibition against proprietary trading 
necessarily depends on how one defines the term.27 The Dodd–Frank 
definition (discussed in Part II below) generally focuses on the buying 
and selling activity of a “banking entity” that is “engaging as a 
principal” for its “trading account” in a range of financial instruments.28  
The structure of the Rule provides more guidance as to the specific 
kinds of activity Congress sought to address.  For example, the Rule’s 
definition of a “trading account” focuses on “short-term price 
movement” and “near term” purchases and sales, rather than long-term 
appreciation in the value of a financial instrument.29 The Rule’s safe 
 
 27. The Eighteenth Amendment, after all, may have survived to this day had the Volstead Act 
not defined “intoxicating liquors” so aggressively.  Volstead Act, supra note 1, at 307–08  (defining the 
term to include “any beverage containing  one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume”). 
 28. Some commentators have used broader definitions—such as “the purchase or sale of a 
financial instrument with the intent to profit from the difference between the purchase price and sale 
price”—though such definitions do not necessarily reflect the distinction between “trading accounts” 
and other accounts for regulatory purposes.  Duffie, supra note 9, at 2. 
 29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6) (2010) (definition of “trading account”).  The Joint Proposing 
Release suggests that a “near term” trading horizon for purposes of classifying trading activities under 
guidance provided under relevant accounting standards is “generally measured in hours and days rather 
than months or years.”  Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68859 n.102 (quoting FASB ASC 
Master Glossary definition of “trading”). 
5
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harbors for underwriting, market making, and securitization likewise 
appear to contemplate a distinction between activity that facilitates 
trading by clients, customers, and counterparties (for which the firm is 
presumably compensated in spreads, commissions, or other fees) and 
activity in which the entity shares in profits with (or seeks to profit from 
trading against) clients, customers, and counterparties.30 
The Rule reflects growing concern about the importance of 
proprietary trading within banking organizations and the risks posed by 
such activity.31  The gradual rise in proprietary trading as a source of 
revenues and risk for investment and commercial banks reflects a 
variety of factors.  Competition among public bank holding companies 
and the transformation of investment banks from partnerships to public 
holding company structures has put the financial services industry at the 
mercy of shareholders (including executives and traders receiving equity 
compensation) fixated on short-term quarterly performance.32  The 
profitability of traditional commercial and investment banking activity 
has declined as a result of deregulation and heightened competition.33  In 
addition, the last decade’s subprime lending boom (and bust) fed the 
growth of the market for credit default swaps and other derivatives34 and 
the proliferation of highly leveraged structured products, many of which 
were marketed to hedge funds,35 which themselves in some cases were 
sponsored, capitalized, or financed through prime brokerage 
arrangements by investment or commercial banks.36 
A causal relationship between such proprietary trading and the 
financial crisis is more difficult to establish, although it is easier to 
 
 30. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (safe harbor for “underwriting or market-making-related 
activities”). 
 31. See Merkley & Levin, supra note 13, at 520–22; FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 35, 49, 65–
66. 
 32. See, e.g., ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: 
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 236–38, 276–80 (2007). 
 33. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 227 
(hypothesizing that the banking industry’s “stability and low-risk profitability have largely vanished 
since the mid-1970s” on account of these trends). 
 34. FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 38–51, 190–95. 
 35. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, HEDGE FUND SURVEY, charts 7–8, available at 
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/resource/staff-data-projects/hedge-fund-survey (illustrating increased 
holding of equity positions in residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations 
from Dec. 2005 to Dec. 2007). 
 36. See, e.g., Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding 
Companies: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 53–54 
(2010) (statement of Deputy Secretary Neal S. Wolin, Department of the Treasury) (observing that some 
investment banks, such as Bear Stearns, were forced to bail out their sponsored hedged funds during the 
crisis and thereby imperiled their own capital adequacy). 
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assert that proprietary trading exacerbated the impact of the crisis.37  As 
discussed below, advocates of dampening, segregating, or restricting 
proprietary trading by banking organizations have offered a variety of 
justifications, including heightened moral hazard, conflicts of interest, or 
destabilization of cash and derivatives markets.  Advocates of less 
intrusive regulation argue that the root causes of the financial crisis are 
either attributable to activities unrelated to the proposed Volcker Rule 
prohibition (e.g., loan defaults and securitization) or will have been 
adequately addressed by other regulatory efforts—such as leverage and 
net capital limitations, and centralized trading, clearance, and reporting 
of derivatives transactions.  Each of these justifications is discussed in 
turn. 
A. Exacerbating Moral Hazard 
Chief among the criticisms of proprietary trading is that it allows 
firms with special access to government assistance to reap profits from 
their trading activity while shifting losses in their trading portfolios to 
the public.  In Chairman Volcker’s words: 
Proprietary trading of financial instruments—essentially speculative in 
nature—engaged in primarily for the benefit of limited groups of highly 
paid employees and of stockholders does not justify the taxpayer subsidy 
implicit in routine access to Federal Reserve credit, deposit insurance or 
emergency support.38 
As promulgated, however, the Rule extends to banking affiliates that 
are not expressly entitled to federal assistance.  For example, the Rule 
applies to any control person of an FDIC-insured depository institution 
(such as bank holding companies) and any non-bank affiliate or 
subsidiary of an FDIC-insured depository institution (such as a broker–
dealer, swaps entity, insurance company, or other financial services 
 
 37. Duffie, supra note 9, at 25 (suggesting that the losses from loan defaults on conventional 
banking activities were far greater in magnitude than market making losses, though that crisis “was 
nevertheless exacerbated by the proprietary trading losses of some large broker dealers . . . and the 
broker–dealer affiliates of Citibank and some foreign banks”); Julian T.S. Chow & Jay Surti, Making 
Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It? 14–15 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper 11-236, 
2011) (finding a “[p]ositive association . . . between susceptibility to distress and the importance of 
trading income as a revenue generated for U.S. and European banks,” but not Asian banks); see also 
GAO Proprietary Trading Study, supra note 11, at 24–26 (finding that the six largest bank holding 
companies “usually experienced larger revenues and losses from activities other than stand-alone 
proprietary trading and investments in hedge and private equity funds” based on the firm’s publicly 
reported net income during the period from June 2006 to Dec. 2010). 
 38. Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, to 
the Agencies, Attachment at 1 (Feb. 13, 2012) (emphasis omitted), available at http://regulations.gov 
(retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0209). 
7
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provider).39 
The Rule does not apply to entities that are not affiliated with a bank, 
on the premise that they are not entitled to federal assistance in the event 
of material distress.  As a result, bank-affiliated financial services 
providers may be at a competitive disadvantage to freestanding 
investment banks or insurance companies to the extent that the latter 
may freely engage in proprietary trading.  Congress has addressed this 
asymmetry to a certain degree by giving the Federal Reserve Board the 
authority to impose “additional capital requirements for and additional 
quantitative limits” with regard to proprietary trading by certain 
“nonbank financial companies” if the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) determines that their activities may pose a threat to the 
financial stability of the United States.40 
To the extent that the moral hazard created by such federal assistance 
is a justification for Rule, some critics argue that segregation of 
proprietary trading activities into bankruptcy-remote affiliates, rather 
than outright prohibitions on proprietary trading by banking affiliates, 
would have adequately addressed moral hazard.41  For example, Section 
716 of the Dodd–Frank Act (the Lincoln Amendment) contemplates 
compartmentalization of certain swaps trading activities into nonbank 
affiliates of an insured depository institution as a condition of federal 
assistance.42 Other critics of the Rule have observed that Dodd–Frank’s 
 
 39. See text accompanying notes 64–66. 
 40. See supra note 24 (defining “nonbank financial company”).  Section 113 of the Dodd–Frank 
Act authorized FSOC to require U.S. “nonbank financial companies” to become subject to prudential 
standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board if the Council determines that “material 
financial distress” or “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix” of its 
activities “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”  FSOC has published final 
rules and interpretive guidance regarding the administrative process for such determinations.  Authority 
To Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 1310 
(2012). 
 41. See R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions 
Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution is Needed to Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 
BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 33, 61 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857371.  In the UK, 
the Independent Commission on Banking (the Vickers Commission) created by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer has recommended a requirement that banks “ring fence” certain retail deposit-taking and 
commercial lending activities within a single entity that would be subject to higher capital charges.  
INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT 233–37 (2011), available at 
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk. 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2012) (codifying the Lincoln Amendment).  Banks are permitted to enter 
into hedging and other similar risk mitigation activities directly related to the insured depository 
institution’s activities—which include interest rate, currency, and related index derivatives to hedge the 
bank’s lending and payment systems activities.  Id. § 8305(d)(1).  Banks are also permitted to engage in 
swaps activities related to their traditional role in underwriting U.S. government, agency, and municipal 
securities.  Id. § 8305(d)(2).  Moreover, § 716 permits banks to enter into credit default swaps (e.g., on 
individual debt or asset-backed securities, or baskets of or indices based on a group of asset-backed 
securities) as long as they are cleared through an SEC-registered clearing agency or CFTC-registered 
derivatives clearing organization.  Id. § 8305(d)(3). 
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alternative approaches to risk regulation, such as heightened capital, 
leverage and margin requirements, are more precise in their application 
than outright prohibition.43 
One might rightly question, however, whether the Treasury or the 
Federal Reserve Board could credibly commit to not bail out any 
systemically significant affiliate; a recent study suggests that 
systemically significant financial institutions continue to enjoy 
significant subsidies (up to 80 basis points in funding costs) from such 
implicit guarantees, notwithstanding higher capital requirements and 
new orderly liquidation regimes adopted in various financial centers.44  
Capital charges alone, moreover, would not necessarily serve as a 
deterrent to proprietary trading; indeed, higher capital charges could 
have the unintended consequence of reducing the level of banking 
services provided by banking entities that elect to divert more capital to 
proprietary trading. 
B. Conflicts of Interest 
Another justification for imposing restrictions on proprietary trading 
by financial intermediaries generally is that they invariably create 
conflicts of interest, whether as a matter of customer protection, investor 
confidence, or corporate governance.  Principal trades with customers as 
part of a firm’s market making or dealing activity—whether purchasing 
customer securities or selling securities to customers from inventory—
necessarily put the interests of the firm at odds with those of the 
customer.45 A firm with prior knowledge of customer trading interest or 
 
 43. See, e.g., Letter from Barry L. Zubrow, Exec. Vice President, JPMorgan Chase & Co., to the 
Dep’t of the Treasury et al., at 3 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using 
document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0277) [hereinafter JPMorgan Chase] (claiming Volcker Rule creates 
“intrusive compliance regime” and same purposes achieved through margin requirements, concentration 
limits, and risk-based deposit insurance premiums); Letter from David Hirschmann, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Feb. 5, 2012), 
available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-0002-1344) (suggesting 
use of pro-growth heightened capital requirements and liquidity standards as alternative to Volcker); 
Letter from Scott C. Goebel, Senior Vice President, Fidelity Investments, to the Fin. Stability Oversight 
Council (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-
0001-0066) (criticizing Volcker Rule while noting that “capital, leverage and liquidity requirements, and 
short-term debt and concentration limits” are “tools of choice” to regulate banks). 
 44. Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 1–5 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 12-128, 
2012).  Cf. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: 
Implications for Financial Regulatory Design?, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399, 406–07, 430–31 (1999) (arguing 
that “[e]mpirical observation . . . discredits the view that a world without deposit insurance is a world of 
market discipline for banks” because market participants will assume the existence of implicit deposit 
protection). 
 45. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding Companies: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement 
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trading portfolios might also trade on the basis of such information in a 
manner that harms the customer’s interests as well as the interests of 
other investors.46  More generally, traders employed by publicly traded 
financial institutions are in conflict with their employers’ public 
shareholders, to the extent that their compensation does not precisely 
mirror the risk and return to the firm created by their activity.47  
The nature of the product being marketed may also create conflicts of 
interest.  Traders who obtain nonpublic information about the financial 
condition of a client of one of its banking or underwriting affiliates may 
use that information to trade at the expense of other security holders of 
the firm.48  In addition, “complex, highly structured, or opaque” 
products, such as asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, 
or more exotic derivatives, elevate such concern49: to the extent that 
such products are often bespoke, do not trade in a liquid market, and are 
sensitive to a variety of risks, banks have a considerable informational 
advantage over their customers with respect to pricing.50 
Cultural changes on Wall Street stand to further exacerbate such 
conflicts.  The increasing fungibility of trading and other investment 
banking skills and the public company structure of many commercial 
 
of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board) (“When the bank itself 
is . . . trading for its own account—it will almost inevitably find itself, consciously or inadvertently, 
acting at cross purposes to the interests of an unrelated commercial customer of a bank.  ‘Inside’ hedge 
funds and equity funds with outside partners may generate generous fees for the bank without the test of 
market pricing, and those same ‘inside’ funds may be favored over outside competition in placing funds 
for clients.”); see also Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Two-Sided Loyalty?: Exploring the Boundaries of 
Fiduciary Duties of Market Makers, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31, 35–46 (2011) (summarizing judicial 
decisions analyzing the application of fiduciary law to conduct by exchange specialists and market 
makers). 
 46. FSOC Study, supra note 25, at 48. 
 47. Will Bunting, The Trouble with Investment Banking: Cluelessness, Not Greed, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 993, 1028–29 (2011).  This risk is addressed, to a certain degree, by rulemaking under 
Section 956(a) and (b) of the Dodd–Frank Act, which require disclosure of, and in some cases prohibit, 
executive compensation arrangements offered by certain financial institutions that either provide 
“excessive compensation, fees, or benefits” or “could lead to material financial loss.”  See Incentive-
Based Compensation Arrangements, 12 C.F.R. § 42 (2011) (proposed rules). 
 48. FSOC Study, supra note 25, at 49. 
 49. Id.  For example, Goldman Sachs conceded in its well-reported settlement with the SEC that 
certain information regarding the composition of the synthetic CDOs in the ABACUS transaction 
(namely, the role and interests of Paulson’s hedge fund in selecting the credit-default swaps selected for 
inclusion in the CDO) were not properly disclosed to the customers to whom those products were sold.  
Brief for Defendant, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229, 2010 WL 2779309 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 2010). 
 50. For example, Dodd–Frank requires dealers and major market participants in swaps and 
security-based swaps to disclose any material risks and conflicts of interest and provide daily marks to 
counterparties in connection with such transactions in order to address this informational asymmetry.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3) (2012) (business conduct requirements under new Section 15F of the 
Securities Exchange Act); 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3) (2012) (business conduct requirements under new Section 
4s of the Commodity Exchange Act). 
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and investment banking groups has sharply reduced the long-term 
alignment of interests between traders and their firms.51  Young bankers 
indoctrinated to believe that high reward is coupled with high job 
insecurity train their focus on short-term gains, regardless of the long-
term consequences for the firm or its clients.52  As one former 
investment bank executive observed, such “people who care only about 
making money” will not sustain the long term trust of clients: 
What are three quick ways to become a leader? a) Execute on the firm’s 
“axes,” which is Goldman-speak for persuading your clients to invest in 
the stocks or other products that we are trying to get rid of . . . b) “Hunt 
Elephants” . . . get your clients—some of whom are sophisticated, and 
some of whom aren’t—to trade whatever will bring the biggest profit to 
Goldman . . . c) Find yourself sitting in a seat where your job is to trade 
any illiquid, opaque product with a three-letter acronym.53 
Policymakers, however, have been reluctant to return to a complete 
segregation of financial services, in part because U.S. banks would be at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to European and Asian “universal 
banks,” but also in part on account of the widely held assumption that 
the cross-provision of services promises benefits for both financial 
services providers and their customers.54  Instead, regulatory policy 
continues to focus on regulating conflicts of interest through 
informational barriers and business conduct rules, which are enforced 
through a combination of internal controls and regulatory oversight.55  
 
 51. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 32, at 281 (suggesting that partner tenure has 
declined and staff mobility has increased at investment banks as a result of the “codification” of trading 
and investment banking skills and the increased transparency of publicly traded investment banks). 
 52. See KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 285–94 (2009) 
(discussing the consequences of the “high reward/high risk” employment structure of Wall Street, both 
with respect to serving longer-term client needs and social welfare). 
 53. Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at A27. 
 54. Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Bank Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
5, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/05/business/congress-passes-wide-ranging-bill-easing-bank-
laws.html (quoting among others Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Senator Phil Gramm as 
supportive of the relaxation of the Glass–Steagall restrictions).  But see Kenneth A. Carow et al., Safety-
Net Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING  22–24 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802007 (finding evidence that the removal of 
product line restrictions has resulted in increased bank bargaining power, which can increase customer 
funding costs and reduce capital market access, especially vis-à-vis credit-constrained customers); 
Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost–Benefit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, and Consumer Benefits: A Study of 
the Financial Services Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 347–374 
(2002) (questioning whether the expected benefits of “[e]nhanced competition and efficiency” following 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley were realized). 
 55. FSOC Study, supra note 25, at 50; see, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in 
Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 139–41 (2004) (describing the emergence of 
information barriers in investment bank regulation); Peter C. Buck & Krista R. Bowen, Intrabank 
Conflicts of Interest, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 31 (1999) (same for commercial bank regulation). 
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C. Market Destabilizing Activity 
A third charge against proprietary trading is that, in excess, it 
increases the complexity, opacity, and latent interconnectedness of over-
the-counter derivatives markets.  Commercial and investment banking 
groups dominate trading in over-the-counter derivatives markets, much 
of which trading is concentrated in transactions among the largest such 
institutions.56  In the absence of markets or clearinghouses to standardize 
such instruments and require adequate collateralization, the 
accumulation of significant indirect counterparty credit risk with respect 
to one or more firms, such as in the case of Lehman and AIG, could 
have potentially devastating consequences.57 
On a certain level, these justifications relate more to the integrity of 
market structure, rather than the stability of the U.S. financial system.  
The “flash crash” episode of May 2010, for example, focused concern 
on the technological capacity of exchange operators, the adequacy of 
SEC and self-regulatory monitoring of exchange and other reported 
transactions, and the lack of effective circuit breakers to prevent human 
errors or unanticipated algorithmic trading from cascading.  Likewise, 
Congress sought to address the role of over-the-counter derivatives in 
the recent crisis through the creation of mandatory trade execution, 
clearing and reporting facilities (Title VII facilities) for certain classes of 
non-exchange traded derivatives (swaps and security-based swaps, as 
defined in the Act). 
To the extent, however, that commercial banks rely on such 
derivatives markets for hedging and risk-mitigation in connection with 
their banking activities (e.g., through interest, currency, and credit-
default swaps), the interpretation of the safe harbors for such activities 
under both the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment rely to a 
significant degree on the efficacy of such regulation.  For example, the 
Lincoln Amendment requires banks to effect transactions in credit 
default swaps through Title VII facilities as a condition of qualifying for 
the safe harbor.58 The Volcker Rule, in coordination with the provisions 
of Title VII, thus regulates the ability of banks and their affiliates to 
outsource risk management to swap counterparties. 
 
 56. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 29 (2010) (noting that as of Dec. 2008, the top 5 derivatives 
dealers in the United States accounted for 96% of outstanding OTC contracts made by the leading bank 
holding companies). 
 57. Id. at 29–35; FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 363–64. 
 58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 8305(d)(3) (2012). 
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II. STRUCTURE OF THE VOLCKER RULE 
The Volcker Rule, as discussed above, was ostensibly designed to 
strike a compromise between reestablishing the firewall between 
investment and commercial banking activities under the Glass–Steagall 
Act, on the one hand, and retaining the synergistic benefits of bundling 
such services championed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, on the 
other.  The Glass–Steagall Act erected a barrier between commercial 
banking activities (e.g., deposit-taking and custodial services) and 
investment banking activities (which included, among other things, 
proprietary trading in connection with underwriting, market making, and 
dealing activities).59 Over the next sixty years, a series of orders issued 
by federal banking regulators (culminating in the Federal Reserve 
Board’s 1998 Citigroup Order)60 and sympathetic judicial decisions 
rendered this barrier obsolete.61 The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 
repealed this prohibition and permitted well capitalized and well 
managed bank holding companies to affiliate with other financial 
services providers, subject to “functional regulation” of each affiliate.62 
To a certain degree, the Volcker Rule reflects the Glass–Steagall 
philosophy that certain activities should not, for political or practical 
reasons, coexist in the same corporate structure.  Like Glass–Steagall, 
the Rule ostensibly takes the position that bank holding companies must 
 
 59. Of the four key provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act, sections 16 and 21 remain in force.  12 
U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (“The business of dealing in securities and stock . . . shall be limited to purchasing 
and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, 
customers, and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of 
securities or stock.”); 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2012) (forbidding any company or person in the business 
of “issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, 
to engage . . . in the business of receiving deposits”).  The two key provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act 
relating to the permitted activities and governance of affiliates of U.S. depository institutions, Sections 
20 and 32, were repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 78 (1996). 
 60. In 1998, the Board issued an order permitting the merger of Citigroup and Travelers Group, 
even though Travelers’ insurance underwriting activities and the investment banking activities of its 
affiliate Salomon Smith Barney would not have been consistent with the BHCA’s restrictions and 
revenue limitations.  Order Issued Under Section 3 & 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, FED. RES. 
BULL., Nov. 1998, at 985.  Prof. Wilmarth notes that the FRB’s approval permitted Citigroup to operate 
as a de facto “universal bank” for up to five years without divesting these subsidiaries, and that many 
contemporary commentators viewed the transaction as a gamble that Congress would dismantle the 
Glass–Steagall prohibitions against such affiliation within that time.  Wilmarth, supra note 33, at 221. 
 61. Wilmarth, supra note 33, 318–20; Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the 
Judicial Process: the Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
672, 703–04 (1987). 
 62. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-112, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (repealing 
Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) & (l)(1) (2012) 
(providing that a “financial holding company may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the 
shares of any company engaged in any activity” determined to be “financial in nature or incidental to 
such financial activity,” or “complementary to a financial activity,” provided that its depository 
institution subsidiaries are “well capitalized” and “well managed”). 
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terminate or spin off certain proprietary trading activities, whether 
because of the nature of the product being traded or because of the 
nature of the activity.  The Rule, however, recognizes that a complete 
ban would put U.S. banking groups at a competitive disadvantage in the 
international marketplace, and therefore permits non-bank subsidiaries 
of financial holding companies to continue to engage in certain 
enumerated categories of customer-oriented proprietary trading, as 
envisioned by Gramm–Leach–Bliley.63 
Structurally, the Volcker Rule consists of a general prohibition on 
proprietary trading by banking entities (including the acquisition or 
retention of an interest in certain funds that engage in proprietary 
trading), subject to several safe harbors for permitted activities and 
permitted fund investments, which are further qualified by certain 
statutory limitations on activities or investments.  Each of these 
elements is discussed in turn. 
A. General Prohibition on Proprietary Trading 
The Volcker Rule states that, unless otherwise provided, a “banking 
entity” shall “not engage in proprietary trading” or “acquire or retain 
any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a 
hedge fund or a private equity fund.”64 “Banking entity,” for this 
purpose, is defined to include all insured depository institutions and 
their subsidiaries and affiliates,65 although the Federal Reserve Board is 
empowered to adopt “additional capital requirements for and additional 
quantitative limits with regards to” such activity if conducted by SIFIs 
subject to FRB supervision.66 
More importantly, “proprietary trading” is defined to mean: 
[E]ngaging as a principal for the trading account of the [relevant entity] in 
any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any 
security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future 
delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any 
other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking 
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission may, by rule . . . determine.67 
A “trading account,” in this context, refers to “any account used for 
acquiring or taking positions in [such securities and instruments] for the 
 
 63. See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-112, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338; 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1843(k)(1) & (l)(1). 
 64. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2010). 
 65. Id. § 1851(h)(1). 
 66. Id. § 1851(a)(2). 
 67. Id. § 1851(h)(4). 
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purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell 
in order to profit from short-term price movements), and any such other 
accounts” so designated by the relevant regulators.68 
B. Permitted Activities 
Despite the breadth of the statutory prohibition, the Volcker Rule 
enumerates several “permitted activities” in which banking entities may 
engage, subject to certain statutory limitations as well as any limitations 
or restrictions imposed by the relevant federal financial regulator.  
Permitted activities include several of the activities national and state 
member banks were permitted to engage in under Glass–Steagall, such 
as brokerage activities and dealing in government, agency and municipal 
securities.69  “Risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with and 
related to individual and aggregated positions, contracts, or holdings” 
(such as the use of interest rate and currency swaps in connection with 
banking activities) also qualify for an exemption, although the Rule 
requires that such activities be “designed to reduce the specific risks to 
the banking entity” with respect to “such positions, contracts, or other 
holdings.”70 Moreover, securitization—itself one of the most risky 
activities identified during the recent financial crisis—remains a 
permitted activity under Dodd–Frank. 
The Volcker Rule also contains exceptions designed for affiliates of 
financial holding companies (FHCs) subject to functional regulation by 
other federal or state regulators.71  For example, regulated insurance 
companies may trade in securities and other instruments “in compliance 
with, and subject to” state insurance law.72  Likewise, bank-affiliated 
brokers and dealers are permitted to engage in “underwriting or market-
making-related activities” as SEC- or CFTC-registered intermediaries, 
 
 68. Id. § 1851(h)(6).  The bank regulators have separately been charged with carrying out a study 
on bank investment activities.  See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 620, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631. 
 69. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) and (D).  Proprietary trading and other restricted activity 
conducted outside of the United States by foreign qualified banking organizations and certain other 
predominantly foreign banking organizations under BHCA §§ 4(c)(9) and (13) is also entitled to a safe 
harbor from the Rule.  Id. § 1851(d)(1)(H) and (I). 
 70. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(C). 
 71. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (defining a “financial holding company” to mean any bank holding 
company that meets the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) and is therefore generally permitted to 
engage in any activity that is “financial in nature,” “incidental to such financial activity,” or 
“complementary to a financial activity” pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)). 
 72. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(F)(i).  This authority is qualified by the proviso that the activity in question 
has not been determined by the appropriate federal banking agencies to be “insufficient to protect the 
safety and soundness of the banking entity, or of the financial stability of the United States.”  Id. 
§ 1851(d)(1)(F)(ii). 
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as long as their activities are not “designed . . . to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”73 
While the regulators have the authority to preserve “[s]uch other activity 
as [they determine] . . . would promote and protect the safety and 
soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United 
States,”74 regulators are understandably loath to assert such authority to 
expand specific safe harbors (at least in the first iteration of rulemaking). 
C. Sponsorship of Private Funds 
In addition to prohibiting proprietary trading by banking entities 
themselves, the Act also provides that banking entities shall not “acquire 
or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or 
sponsor a hedge fund or private equity fund.”75  Banking entities may 
organize, offer, and manage a private fund for their customers in 
connection with bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory 
services provided that the entity does not (and discloses to its customers 
that it does not) guarantee, assume, or insure the fund’s obligations.76  
Investments may also be made to provide funds with “sufficient initial 
equity . . . to permit the fund to attract unaffiliated investors,” provided 
that the entity “shall actively seek unaffiliated investors to reduce or 
dilute the investment” and reduce its investment to a de minimis 
amount.77 
D. Statutory Limitations 
The Volcker Rule qualifies all of the above activities with certain 
statutory limitations—or rather, restatements of the articulated policy 
reasons motivating the Rule—which federal financial regulators must 
implement through rulemaking.  The first such limitation permits 
regulators to restrict any transaction, class of transactions, or activity 
that would “involve or result in a material conflict of 
interest . . . between the banking entity and its clients, customers, or 
counterparties.”78  The statutory language is sufficiently ambiguous to 
 
 73. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B). 
 74. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(J). 
 75. Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B). 
 76. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G).  Moreover, a banking entity may offer prime brokerage services to funds 
in which it has such an investment, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the Rule on relationships 
between banking entities and such funds analogous to those under § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, as 
long as the banking entity is certified to be in compliance with the Act’s restrictions.  Id. § 1851(f)(1)–
(3). 
 77. Id. § 1851(d)(4). 
 78. Id. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(i). 
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permit regulators to intervene in situations not only where a conflict of 
interest imperils the financial condition of a banking entity, but also 
where the transaction might put clients, customers, and counterparties of 
the banking entity at risk. 
The second and third statutory limitations permit regulators to restrict 
any transaction, class of transactions, or activity that would “result, 
directly or indirectly, in a material exposure by the banking entity to 
high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies” or “pose a threat to the 
safety and soundness of such banking entity.”79 For example, regulators 
could prohibit certain forms of algorithmic trading, even if conducted in 
accordance with the market making or brokerage safe harbors or in 
permitted instruments.  The final statutory limitation parallels the 
mandate of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Federal 
Reserve Board to identify and restrict activity that would “pose a threat 
to the financial stability of the United States,” 80 regardless of the impact 
of such activity on the firm. 
III. DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION 
However clear the spirit of the Rule may be, its language is 
frustratingly vague; accordingly, much depends on both the 
resourcefulness and fidelity of the federal financial regulators to carry 
out its purposes.  The comments received on the proposed rules suggest 
that the battle between the “wets” and the “dries” has only begun.  The 
wets, dumbfounded by the federal financial regulators’ inability to 
appreciate the important contribution of bank proprietary trading to the 
liquidity of financial markets, have roundly criticized the proposed rules 
(which, in many cases, merely track the statute itself) as exceeding 
Congressional intent.81  The dries, postulating that a return to the status 
quo thirty years ago should not be that difficult to achieve, have urged 
federal financial regulators to tighten the rules even more.82 
While a comprehensive discussion of the rulemaking is impossible, it 
may be useful to focus on particular aspects of the proposed rulemaking 
 
 79. Id. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii). 
 80. Id. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(iv). 
 81. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase, supra note 43; Letter from Simon Greenshields, Global Co-Head 
of Commodities, Morgan Stanley, to the Agencies, Attachment No. 2, 8, 12–13 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0304). 
 82. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Dir., U.S. Pub. Interest 
Research Grp., to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://regulations.gov 
(retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-0002-1346); Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to 
the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et. al. (Feb.13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov 
(retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0308); Letter from Occupy the SEC to the Fed. Reserve 
Bd. et al. (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-
0014-0221). 
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that have drawn the most industry and academic attention.  In the 
following subparts, I consider in turn (1) the difficulty of defining the 
scope of key terms under the Rule, (2) the difficulty of devising 
quantitative metrics that capture the spirit of the Rule, and (3) the 
difficulty of administering the supervisory, enforcement, and 
compliance structure contemplated by the Rule and the proposed 
rulemaking. 
A. Defining Permitted Activities Qualitatively 
As discussed above, the Volcker Rule prohibits any banking entity 
from engaging as a principal for its “trading account” in any transaction 
involving certain enumerated financial instruments unless such activity 
falls within one of the permitted activities under the Rule.  Industry 
commenters have requested that the financial regulators interpret them 
in the manner that preserves the status quo as much as possible—for 
example, by viewing the safe harbors as “guidelines” or principles to be 
enforced through ongoing supervision rather than “hard coded” rules, 
noncompliance with which can trigger regulatory action.83 
The difficulty faced by regulators, however, is that any rulemaking 
under the safe harbors will necessary entail qualitative distinctions based 
on the intent of the trading entity.  It is conceivable that regulators could 
rely entirely on quantitative metrics to detect activity that exceeds the 
safe harbors, but such an ex post application of a qualitative standard 
could shift the enforcement burden significantly to regulators and thus 
allow the safe harbors to swallow the Rule.84 Moreover, as discussed 
below, some types of trading activity—such as “market-making-related 
activities or “risk-mitigating hedging activities”—are susceptible to a 
wide range of interpretation.  To the extent that such statutory terms or 
concepts are hardwired into other parts of the federal financial 
regulatory scheme, any effort to reinterpret them expansively in the 
context of the Volcker Rule could be viewed as an unwanted precedent. 
 
 83. See, e.g., Letter from Randolph C. Snook, Executive Vice President, Sec. Ind. and Fin. 
Markets Ass’n (SIFMA), to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council 11–12 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at 
http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-0002-0909).  Prof. Cunningham 
describes the complications inherent in implementing or enforcing a “principles-only system” of 
regulations.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based 
Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1433 
(2007) (stating principles-based regulation alone without specific implementing rules is “vulnerable to 
abuse”). 
 84. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
621–24 (1992) (contrasting the ex ante costs of developing rules with the ex post costs of applying and 
enforcing standards). 
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1. “Trading Account” 
Proprietary trading, as discussed above, is specifically defined by 
reference to the term “trading account,” which the Rule defines as “any 
account used for acquiring or taking positions” in certain covered 
financial instruments “principally for the purpose of selling in the near 
term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from short-
term price movements).”85  Banks subject to the market risk capital rule 
must already book “trading assets” into a “trading account” for purposes 
of calculating the market-risk-related capital charge.86 To avoid evasion 
of this requirement (as well as to address trading assets held at affiliates 
not subject to Board regulation), the regulators have expanded the 
definition of “trading account” to include accounts that meet the 
purpose-driven test articulated in the statute as well as any account used 
by an SEC- or CFTC-registered dealer in connection with the activities 
requiring such registration.87  
Some commenters have recommended decoupling the definition of 
“trading account” from specific accounts used for purposes of 
computing capital charges.88  In their view, the cost–benefit analysis for 
allocation of trades into the “trading accounts” contemplated by the 
market risk capital rule is significantly different than the Volcker Rule.89  
For example, the Rule could result in lower capital charges if firms 
move assets currently held in a trading account for prudential reasons to 
nontrading accounts in order to avoid the Rule’s restrictions.  Similarly, 
federal financial regulators might come under pressure to keep capital 
charges for trading accounts low: if banking organizations move 
problematic trades out of their existing nontrading accounts to avoid 
triggering the rebuttable presumption, the positions they hold in trading 
accounts could increase significantly. 
More controversially, the agencies have adopted a “rebuttable 
 
 85. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6) (2010). 
 86. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, at GL-77 to GL -78 (2007) 
(defining “Trading Account”), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-
9C20110630_i.pdf. 
 87. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68945 (proposed joint rule § ___.3(b)(2)(i)(C)).  A 
dealer may, of course, be required to register with any of the federal financial regulators depending on 
the nature of the instruments in which it deals (e.g., corporate debt and equity securities, government 
securities, municipal securities, swaps, security-based swaps). 
 88. See, e.g., Letter from SIFMA-ABA-Fin. Servs. Roundtable & the Clearing House to the 
Agencies, at A-16 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: 
OCC-2011-0014-0174) [hereinafter SIFMA-ABA]; Letter from Juliana S. O’Reilly, Vice President & 
Chief Bank Regulatory Counsel, Am. Express, to the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 12–14 
(Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0136) 
[hereinafter American Express]. 
 89. See, e.g., American Express, supra note 88, at 11. 
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presumption” that an account (other than a dealer account or bank 
trading account) may nevertheless be deemed a “trading account” if 
used to acquire or take a covered financial position for less than sixty 
days.  Some commenters have suggested removing the presumption—
and instead relying solely on the purpose test—and further applying a 
“negative presumption” that positions held over sixty days are not 
effected for short-term profit.90  Even if such a rebuttable presumption 
were deemed procrustean, absent a bright-line rule, firms could easily 
reallocate long-term positions to such accounts in order to create doubts 
about the “purpose” or “intent” of the activity in an account.91 
Regulators will ultimately have to decide whether further account 
delineations will result in fairer application of the Rule or simply more 
opportunities for evasion by sophisticated banking entities at the 
expense of smaller ones.  The account-by-account approach is not only 
strongly implied by the text of the Rule itself, but also likely imposes the 
least administrative cost on banks (and the least administrative burden 
on bank supervisors).”92  Any attempt to complicate account structure 
will only heighten the temptation to undermine existing accounts to 
accommodate trading activity—for example, by abusing suspense 
accounts, customer discretionary accounts, and custodial accounts, in 
addition to any accounts for investment activities and permitted 
proprietary trading accounts.93 
2. Market-Making-Related Activities 
One of the Rule’s most controversial exemptions is for “underwriting 
and market-making-related activities.”  The safe harbor permits banking 
affiliates to engage in these traditional investment banking activities and 
related hedging activities, subject only to the requirement that such 
 
 90. See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-19 to A-20. 
 91. Indeed, some supporters of the Rule have balked at the regulators’ proposal categorically to 
exclude from the definition of “trading account” both bona fide liquidity management accounts and 
accounts used for repurchase agreements and securities loans, to the extent that such short-term 
financing transactions can (particularly if inadequately collateralized) result in naked positions that place 
banking institutions at significant risk in the event of a counterparty default.  See, e.g., Merkley & Levin 
Letter, supra note 23, at 11–13. 
 92. Cf. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the 
D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1835 (2012) (“In a 
contemporary legal and political climate that is defined by a rising skepticism of government and more 
particularly of regulation, the SEC (and for that matter all independent regulatory agencies) must accept 
that it cannot support its rulemaking only through generalized, undeveloped assertions of a proposed 
rule’s impact on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.”). 
 93. See generally Jeffry L. Davis et al., Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Cases 
Involving Fraudulent Trade Allocation Schemes, 49 BUS. LAW. 591 (1994) (describing the potential 
abuses in trade allocation when financial intermediaries trade the same security or commodity for 
several accounts during the course of a business day). 
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activities are “designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term 
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”94  The regulators have 
explicated this safe harbor by requiring that the entity hold itself out as a 
market maker and be duly registered as such with the relevant 
regulator.95  More controversially, the relevant banking entity’s 
activities must be “designed to generate revenues primarily from fees, 
commissions, bid/ask spreads or other income not attributable” to 
appreciation in the value of covered positions or the hedging of such 
positions.96  As required by the Rule and discussed in Part C below, the 
entity is further required to establish an internal compliance program to 
ensure compliance with these requirements.97 
Commentators have objected to defining “market-making-related 
activities” by reference to risk and revenue (and the more precise 
metrics discussed in Part B), largely by arguing that the term refers not 
just to traditional market making in publicly traded equity securities 
(where market makers post continuous quotes), but also facilitating 
customer trading in less liquid instruments such as corporate debt and 
over-the-counter derivatives, for which prices are not publicly quoted 
but privately negotiated.98  For such transactions, market makers assume 
significant proprietary risk both because (1) finding a party willing to 
take the opposite side of trade might take a significant period of time 
and (2) they are subject to the risk of adverse selection when dealing 
with parties who may be better informed as to the value of a security.99  
Because the compensation earned for such “capital commitment” varies 
with these risks, industry commentators have considered a standard for 
market making based on a schedule of fees and commissions or quoted 
spreads to be inappropriate.100 
The regulators have endorsed this expansive view in the Proposing 
Release, although they have not had significant success in distinguishing 
market making from dealing in the over-the-counter market.  Critical to 
the regulators’ position is the view that over-the-counter market making 
can be identified as a low-risk, passive, customer-initiated service.101  
Supporters of a more restrictive rule have differing interpretations.  
 
 94. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (2010). 
 95. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68946–48 (proposed joint rule § ___.4(b)(2)(iv)). 
 96. Id at 68947  (proposed joint rule § ___.4(b)(2)(v)). 
 97. Id. (proposed joint rule § ___.4(b)(2)(i)). 
 98. See, e.g., Letter from Jim Rosenthal, Chief Operating Officer, Morgan Stanley et al., to the 
Agencies 21 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-
2011-0014-0304); Duffie, supra note 9, at 4, 10. 
 99. See Duffie, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68960–63 (commenting on the identification 
of permitted market-making-related activities). 
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First, much of the customer facilitation that the industry would like to 
include in the definition of “market-making-related activities”—
particularly with illiquid, hard-to-value instruments—has the potential to 
create the kind of conflicts of interest and market destabilizing activity 
that the Volcker Rule is also designed to address.102  Second, those 
supporting a more restrictive implementation argue that the Rule does 
not call into question the desirability of market making, but merely the 
need to rely on banking entities to perform it.103 
More importantly, broadening the definition of market maker could 
significantly affect the authority of the SEC, CFTC, and FRB in policing 
the Securities Exchange Act and the Commodity Exchange Act.  
“Market making,” as defined in the Exchange Act,104 refers to a specific 
role played by dealers in equity and options markets for which they are 
entitled to preferential treatment under federal securities law.105  These 
provisions exist in part not only because regulators consider market 
making activity to be less risky than proprietary trading,106 but also 
because concerns about financial responsibility and conflicts of interest 
must yield to the objective of facilitating continuous trading on 
organized exchanges.107 
While the agencies have been receptive to the idea of broadening the 
Rule’s concept of “market making” to encompass all firms that hold 
themselves out as regularly providing liquidity to the market,108 those 
 
 102. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph E. Stiglitz, Columbia Bus. Sch., to the Fin. Stability Oversight 
Council 2 (Nov. 6, 2010), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-
0002-1133). 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 1–2. 
 104. Section 3(a)(38) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(38) (2012) (defining “market 
maker” to mean “any specialist permitted to act as a dealer, any dealer acting in the capacity of block 
positioner, and any dealer who, with respect to a security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in 
an inter-dealer communications system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell such security for 
his own account on a regular or continuous basis”).  15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (2012).  The reference to “block 
positioners,” in this definition, could either be construed as a mandate to permit a broader scope of 
proprietary trading under the guise of market making or simply reflect the ability to accommodate the 
“near term demands” of customers and clients. 
 105. See, e.g., id. § 78g(c)(3)(B) (exemption from margin requirements for equity securities), 
§ 78k(a)(1)(A) (exception from parity, priority, and precedence rules). 
 106. See, e.g., Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68961 (asserting that a market maker 
“typically generates significant revenue relative to the risks that it retains” and accordingly “will 
typically demonstrate consistent profitability and low earnings volatility under normal market 
conditions”).  Market making, of course, is nevertheless not a risk-free activity.  See, e.g., MAUREEN 
O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 20–29 (1997) (describing generally the relationship 
between a market maker’s or dealer’s risk of failure and the spread it quotes); LARRY HARRIS, TRADING 
& EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 401 (2003) (describing generally the 
risks and strategies of market makers). 
 107. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-76, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1666, 1678 (publishing 
SEC comment that the market making exception in Section 11(a)(1) of the Exchange Act was included 
because market making was considered “beneficial to the markets”). 
 108. See Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68870–71. 
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efforts will necessarily set potentially unhelpful precedents for the 
application of that term in other areas.  For example, SEC and FINRA 
rulemaking with respect to market making in corporate debt has been 
sporadic because of the complexity of defining the role of such dealers 
in contributing to the liquidity of markets.  Moreover, the SEC and 
CFTC are still scratching the surface in terms of regulating the market 
structure in which other financial instruments trade, and, as I argue 
below, can best implement the market making exemption in tandem 
with such market structure rules.109 
3. Risk-Mitigating Hedging Activities 
The implementation of the safe harbor for “risk-mitigating hedging 
activities” has also been the subject of considerable attention by 
commentators supportive of and opposed to the Volcker Rule 
prohibition.  The statutory safe harbor is limited to those activities “in 
connection with and related to individual or aggregated positions, 
contracts, or other holdings” that are “designed to reduce the specific 
risks to the banking entity” in connection therewith.110  The focus of the 
implementing regulations, and the surrounding commentary, is the 
congruity of the relationship between the positions, contracts, or other 
holdings arising from the banking entity’s core or permissible activities 
and the accompanying hedge. 
The proposed regulations, by way of substance, require that a 
proposed purchase or sale of a covered financial position hedge or 
mitigate one or more specific risks related to individual or aggregated 
positions—giving, as examples, risks that are the subject of Basel II 
classification, such as market risk, credit or counterparty credit risk, and 
currency or foreign exchange risk.  Moreover, the proposed purchase or 
sale must be “reasonably” (not “tangentially,” but also not “fully”111) 
correlated to the risks it is intended to hedge and must not “give rise, at 
the inception of the hedge, to significant exposures that were not already 
present” and which are not contemporaneously hedged.112  The 
 
 109. See infra Part IV. 
 110. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2010).  The “mini-Volcker Rule” similarly excepts “[h]edging 
and other similar risk mitigating activities directly related to [an] insured depository institution’s 
activities” from the requirement that the swaps activity of such depository institutions be pushed out to 
an FRB-supervised affiliate registered with the SEC or CFTC as a condition of receiving federal 
assistance.  15 U.S.C. § 8305(d)(1) (2010). 
 111. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68875. 
 112. Id. at 68948.  Procedurally, the proposed regulations require that such hedging activities be 
conducted in accordance with the written policies, procedures and internal controls of the banking 
entity, and that any hedge be continuously monitored and managed to maintain “a reasonable level of 
correlation” and mitigate “any significant exposure arising out of the hedge after inception.”  Moreover, 
the persons responsible for performing such hedging activities may not be rewarded for proprietary risk-
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Proposing Release seeks further comment as to whether the statutory 
references to “aggregated” positions, contracts or other holdings provide 
sufficient justification for “portfolio hedging” strategies (or create the 
potential for abuse of such strategies).113 
Critics of the Rule have sought greater flexibility, both with respect to 
the variety of hedging strategies permissible and the scope of hedging 
permitted.  Thus, for example, industry commenters have asked 
regulators to reconsider the “correlation” requirement in order to 
facilitate “scenario hedging” or “macro hedging,” which may, for 
example, address low-probability “tail” events without necessarily 
correlating with specific positions in the firm’s portfolio.114  Firms have 
also sought clarification as to their flexibility to pursue the most cost-
effective hedging strategies, including the freedom to hedge positions 
across affiliates or to choose from a variety of hedging strategies.115 
Advocates of more congruent hedging, by contrast, have pushed back 
on the regulators’ proposal to permit dynamic and portfolio hedging on 
the assumption that traders may use the weaker correlation permitted by 
such methodologies to mask proprietary trading.116  The publicity 
surrounding JPMorgan Chase’s recent multibillion dollar losses 
following an improperly placed corporate bond hedge has provided 
some support to the argument that even firms with the most rigorous risk 
management practices can enter into or fail properly to maintain hedges 
that rely on hedging aggregated positions or other more abstract hedging 
methodologies.117 
The structure of the Volcker Rule once again puts regulators into the 
awkward position of defining hedging qualitatively and in a manner that 
might contradict the scope of exemptions for permitted bona fide 
hedging in other contexts.118  In theory, the regulators could rely on 
capital or margin computations to measure the effectiveness of proposed 
 
taking under their compensation arrangements.  Id. (proposed joint rule § ___.5(b)(2)(v)). 
 113. Id. at 68877. 
 114. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase, supra note 43, at 24–25. 
 115. See, e.g., id. at 25; SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-91. 
 116. See Merkley & Levin Letter, supra note 23, at 29; Letter from Better Markets, Inc. to the 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. et al. 18–19 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using 
document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0254). 
 117. See, e.g., David Reilly, J.P. Morgan, Hedges and ‘Asymmetric Accounting’, WALL ST. J. 
(May 23, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304065704577422422211831822.html. 
 118. See, e.g., General Regulations Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2012) 
(defining “bona fide hedging transaction” for economic or commercial indices, rates, values, levels or 
other measures that are considered an “excluded commodity” under the Commodity Exchange Act); 17 
C.F.R. pt. 151, app. B (2012) (providing examples of “bona fide hedging” transactions for purposes of 
position limits and position reporting in swaps); 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a1–3(T) (2012) (defining “bona fide 
hedge transactions” in certain securities for purposes of parity, priority, and precedence rules). 
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transactions in eliminating or reducing risk.  A rule that relied solely on 
the quantitative impact of a hedge on the risk of a firm’s portfolio, 
however, would shift the burden to bank supervisors and regulators to 
identify and challenge transactions that result in inappropriate exposure 
to risk under the firm’s own risk-management framework. 
B. Measuring the Effect of Proprietary Trading 
An essential component of the regulatory framework developed by 
the federal financial regulators in implementing the Volcker Rule is the 
recordkeeping and monthly reporting of certain quantitative 
measurements for firms of sufficient size.119  The statistics are required 
to be compiled by each trading unit, with the level of detail dependent 
on whether the entity is engaged in market-making-related activities or 
underwriting, hedging, and other permitted activities.120  Market-
making-related activities require the most detailed reporting, including 
not only measures of risk management and sources of revenue (most of 
which are also applicable to other permitted activities), but also 
measures of revenue relative to risk and customer-facing activity.121  
The purpose of these recordkeeping and reporting obligations, among 
other stated goals, is to assist the banking entity and its regulator in 
monitoring trading activity, identifying activity warranting further 
review, and evaluating compliance with the safe harbors for permitted 
activities.122 
From the regulators’ perspective, the recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements are a double-edged sword.  First, the existence of the 
statistics themselves will alter the behavior of regulated entities.  
Second, once the regulators have information, they have to decide what 
to do with it—when investigations should be triggered, how 
noncompliance with the Rule will be defined and how the quantitative 
measures will factor into those decisions, and what steps the regulator 
will take to correct violations.  While all of the federal financial 
regulators juggle similar metrics in connection with their oversight of 
capital adequacy and liquidity, the qualitative aspects of the Volcker 
Rule—which turn on externalities to the federal government, 
counterparties, and markets, rather than the financial solvency and 
 
 119. The requirements are applicable to banking entities and their subsidiaries and affiliates that 
(on a consolidated basis) have trading assets and liabilities the gross sum of which is greater than or 
equal to $1 billion, with heightened requirements applicable if the gross sum is greater than or equal to 
$5 billion.  Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68956–57. 
 120. Id. at 68957. 
 121. Id. at 68957–60. 
 122. Id. at 68956. 
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stability of the firm—will make those judgments significantly more 
difficult in practice, particularly when the two goals conflict. 
1. Revenue Metrics 
In addition to daily calculation of certain risk-management statistics 
used by firms and financial regulators,123 the federal financial regulators 
have requested banking entities to calculate daily by trading unit certain 
source-of-revenue measurements.124  For market-making-related 
activities, banking entities must further calculate certain measures of 
profit volatility (Comprehensive P/L Volatility and Portfolio P/L 
Volatility), ratios of profits to volatility, and additional statistics 
(number of unprofitable days and skewness and kurtosis of profit and 
loss).125 While risk-management practices are part of the firm’s overall 
risk-management obligations under existing and enhanced regulation, 
the revenue and risk-to-revenue metrics are meant to flag whether 
activity is attributable to impermissible proprietary trading, on the 
assumption that market-making-related activity is associated with lower 
risks and more stable returns. 
Firms have certainly questioned these assumptions, particularly with 
respect to dealing in illiquid instruments that require sustained capital 
commitment and carry greater risk.126  Academic and industry 
commenters have also observed that the regulations fail expressly to 
take into account the variety of financial instruments and the different 
conditions under which they trade.127  One scholar has specifically noted 
that the metrics themselves might encourage firms to withdraw from 
dealing in such instruments, preferring to “cream skim” easy order flow, 
and thus withdrawing liquidity in the market from the instruments that 
need it the most.128 
The proposed metrics, as the federal financial regulators note, “are 
not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the identification or 
permissible or impermissible activities,”129 and firms are required to 
consider asset classes in establishing risk factor sensitivities in their risk-
management policy.  But the incentive structure created by such metrics, 
 
 123. These include VaR, Stress VaR, VaR Exceedance, certain Risk Factor Sensitivities, and Risk 
and Position Limits.  Id. at 68957. 
 124. These include Comprehensive Profit and Loss, Portfolio Profit and Loss, Fee Income and 
Expense, Spread Profit and Loss, and Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution to specific market and 
risk factors.  Id. at 68958. 
 125. Id. at 68957–60. 
 126. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase, supra note 43, at 13. 
 127. See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 69–70; see, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-109. 
 128. Duffie, supra note 9, at 4, 20. 
 129. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68956. 
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both within and across firms, should give regulators some pause.  
Within firms, the Volcker Rule may create significant incentives to 
parcel proprietary trades throughout an organization’s trading units, 
based on each unit’s relative capacity to “absorb” additional risk and 
volatility.130  Moreover, as banking organizations continually acquire 
and absorb other financial institutions, it is inevitable that compliance 
personnel will lag in demarcating boundaries of trading units. 
Across firms, the Volcker Rule may create incentives for firms 
collectively to identify certain “targets” for risk and revenue metrics, 
with a view to making it difficult for regulators to identify anomalous 
activity at any one firm, or among trading units executing identical or 
similar strategies at different firms.  Because that collective activity 
would be framed as an attempt to achieve compliance with federal 
financial regulation, rather than cartelization of the financial sector, it 
would be difficult to challenge its legality.  That behavior could 
significantly increase the cost of financial services to the extent that 
competitors such as hedge funds or independent investment banks could 
not fill the void. 
2. Customer-Facing Metrics 
In addition to measures of revenue and revenue volatility, the 
proposed rules require firms to record and report certain statistics 
relating to the extent to which their trading activity is with and 
reasonably expected to meet the near term need of customers.  In 
addition to statistics relating to the ratio of trades effected with 
customers and non-customers,131 banking entities are required to record 
and report statistics relating inventory turnover (weighted by risk) and 
the aging of inventory and liabilities.  Industry commenters have viewed 
some of these statistics as misleading, insofar as concepts like 
“inventory” may not readily apply to certain financial instruments,132 
while academic commenters have further noted that trading across 
 
 130. While trading units are intended to be identified based on a common revenue-generating 
strategy (and in the case of trading operations, as a single unit), it is not difficult to imagine a market 
making desk seeking to place a trade in the account of another unit within the firm or within one of the 
firm’s affiliates, with a view to disguising the nature of the risk undertaken. 
 131. For this purpose, a counterparty is considered to be a “customer” if it is neither a 
counterparty on a securities or commodity exchange nor a broker, dealer, swap dealer, market maker or 
affiliate thereof.  Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68960.  More generally, however, the 
regulators have intimated that the scope of term “customer,” as used in the interpretation of the market 
making related activities exception, may vary depending on the asset class of the financial position and 
the market in which it trades.  For example, in over-the-counter markets, a “customer” might include 
any market participant that “makes use” of the services of a market maker, either upon request or in the 
context of a continuing relationship.  Id. 
 132. See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-112 to A-113. 
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market makers contributes significantly to customer liquidity even when 
an individual market maker does not trade directly with a customer.133 
Much of the criticism seems focused on the desirability of market 
making as a form of financial intermediation, on the assumption that 
only banking entities have the means to conduct such activity subject to 
effective supervision.  An equally pressing concern is whether the 
resulting incentive structure creates a heightened risk of conflicts of 
interest with customers.  Requiring banking entities to interact 
principally with their customers and control inventory as a condition of 
the market-making-related activities safe harbor seems like a recipe for 
conflicts, if market makers conclude that they must push overpriced 
inventory to customers to remain profitable.  This could mean not only 
squeezing more profits out of customers, but also increasing the risk to 
customers of unsuitable products. 
C. Difficult to Enforce 
Having defined the framework of accounts within which banking 
entities must conduct their permissible proprietary trading activity, and 
having specified the metrics that banking entities must compile and 
report with respect to such activity, the question remains as to how 
regulators themselves will supervise banking organizations subject to 
the Volcker Rule.  Much of the initial burden will fall on the firms 
themselves: depending on their size, firms may be required to establish 
(1) “written policies and procedures” regarding activities covered by the 
Rule, (2) “internal controls” reasonably designed to monitor and identify 
potential areas of noncompliance (for example, based on the quantitative 
metrics required by the financial regulators), (3) a “management 
framework” that presumably escalates potentially noncompliant activity 
as necessary for review and appropriate remedial action, (4) 
“independent testing” of the compliance program for effectiveness, (5) 
training and (6) sufficient recordkeeping to demonstrate compliance.134 
Even as that the Rule’s quantitative metrics and the minimum 
standards for a firm’s internal controls under Appendix C of the Rule 
only target the largest firms (generally speaking, those with $1 billion or 
more in gross trading assets plus liabilities),135 affected BHCs could 
 
 133. See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 55–56. 
 134. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68853. 
 135. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68957 (application of metrics); id. at 68956 
(application of additional standards under appendix C).  The additional standards under appendix C also 
apply to any firm whose gross trading assets plus liabilities exceed 10% of its total assets, as well as to 
any firm that has a relationship with or invests in a covered fund that meets certain thresholds or to any 
firm that the relevant federal financial regulator deems appropriate.  Id. at 68918 (proposed joint rule 
§ ___.20(c)(2)(i)–(iii)). 
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have a family of affiliates potentially regulated by each of the five 
Agencies.  Not only must the regulators therefore figure out how they 
will carry out their supervisory and enforcement programs individually, 
they must also develop a means to monitor, verify, and take appropriate 
enforcement action collectively when possibly prohibited activity takes 
place across affiliates. 
1. Interface with Regulator 
The proposed rules force regulators into a realm where iterative 
supervision will displace “rules and standards”—a realm in which some 
regulators may not be equipped to thrive.  Bank regulators have long 
enjoyed significant financial independence from Congress to finance 
their supervisory and enforcement activities; by contrast, market 
regulators such as the SEC and the CFTC have had to rely on less 
generous Congressional appropriations, which are dependent on the 
political cycle.136  The danger is that this state of affairs may embolden 
firms to take greater liberties with the Rule, particularly with respect to 
their SEC/CFTC affiliates, on the assumption that any conduct in which 
the nation’s premier banking conglomerates elect to engage cannot be 
found to violate the regulations as drafted and enforced. 
For example, the SEC’s failure to prevent the collapse of Bear Stearns 
was not necessarily due to a lack of information or attention to its 
program for supervising consolidated supervised entities (CSE), but 
rather a lack of regulatory resources.137  The SEC’s Office of the 
Inspector General found that SEC staff members responsible for 
supervising Bear Stearns were well aware of Bear Stearns’ significant 
concentration of risk in mortgage-backed securities,138 its risk 
management personnel’s lack of expertise, staffing, and independence 
from traders,139 and its failure to comply with “the spirit of Basel II” and 
 
 136. Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV. 
233, 253–56 (2004) (describing the appropriations process for the SEC and the desirability of self-
funding); Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 525 
(2000). See also Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary 
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REGULATION 253, 270–74 (2007) (noting that the 
“costs of banking regulation in the United States are dramatically higher than the costs in any other 
jurisdiction” surveyed, whereas in the area of securities regulation, the level of regulatory intensity is 
lower than in common law countries such as Australia, the UK, and Canada). 
 137. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket? Revisiting Investment Bank 
Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 796 (2010) (summarizing OIG’s findings with respect to the SEC’s 
oversight of Bear Stearns). 
 138. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED 
ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 17–18 (2009). 
 139. Id. at 20–23. 
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to update its internal models to reflect the risks posed by its business.140  
The SEC’s inability to address these problems stemmed from, among 
other factors, inadequate staffing,141 the lack of an effective process for 
tracking material issues to ensure that they were resolved,142 and a lack 
of coordination with other divisions and other regulators.143  While the 
CSE program was voluntary, it was at the core of the SEC’s mission—
unlike the prohibitions of the Volcker Rule, which ostensibly protect the 
safety and soundness of the broker–dealer’s affiliates. 
These problems are compounded by the express sanctions and stated 
intentions of the regulators in enforcing the Rule’s prohibition.  In 
addressing the question of enforcement, the Rule provides only that, 
among other available remedies, the appropriate regulatory agency shall, 
whenever it has reasonable cause to believe a firm has engaged in an 
activity that functions as an evasion of the Rule or a violation of its 
restrictions, “order, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, the 
banking entity . . . to terminate the activity and, as relevant, dispose of 
the investment.”144  The proposed rules, moreover, provide little further 
indication as to how the Rule will be enforced.145  If these intimations 
are correct, enforcement of the Volcker Rule may well be no more 
effective than periodic Prohibition raids, with trading desks routinely 
spotting and exploiting trading opportunities, until such activity is 
detected, wound down, and then proscribed after the fact in internal 
controls.146 
2. Coordination Among Regulators 
Regulatory arbitrage will be another potential risk.  The largest 
banking organizations may well locate their proprietary trading activities 
in the affiliate least likely to attract regulatory scrutiny, either because of 
the size and experience of its supervisory staff or the nature of its 
supervisory or compliance inspection program, or reallocate proprietary 
trading activities to affiliates supervised by regulators sympathetic to 
such activity.147  To further confuse matters, firms may also purport to 
engage in risk-mitigating activities across affiliates within a banking 
organization.  For example, to the extent that the mini-Volcker Rule 
 
 140. Id. at 24–33. 
 141. Id. at 49–50. 
 142. Id. at 37–38. 
 143. Id. at 41–44, 51. 
 144. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2010). 
 145. See Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68956 (proposed joint rule § ___.21). 
 146. See BEHR, supra note 3, at 79–80. 
 147. For example, regulators sensitive to the profitability of their charges may feel compelled to 
allow revenues from proprietary trading to make up for losses incurred in other business lines. 
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requires firms to push most of their swaps activity out of insured 
depository institutions as a condition to receiving federal assistance,148 it 
will be difficult for federal financial regulators to argue that derivatives 
activity should be corralled within individual banking entities.  As a 
result, regulators will need to coordinate their efforts to verify that cross-
affiliate transactions are not intended to evade the Volcker Rule. 
Some commentators have suggested that the appropriate response to 
this problem is for regulators such as the SEC and CFTC to delegate to 
the Federal Reserve Board primary responsibility for handling Rule 
violations.149  That delegation would be consistent with the pattern of 
granting the Federal Reserve Board greater authority to oversee and take 
remedial action with respect to the activities of all affiliates of banking 
groups, notwithstanding the formal regulation of affiliates by their 
“functional” regulators contemplated by Gramm–Leach–Bliley.150  
While the regulators have taken some steps in this regard,151 the history 
of allocation of rulemaking and enforcement authority among federal 
financial regulators does not suggest that regulators will feel 
comfortable relinquishing their prerogatives.152 
IV. THE VOLCKER RULE’S IMPERATIVE: A “REBALANCING OF 
INCENTIVES”153 
If the Volcker Rule stands as a moral statement about the failure of 
the financial services industry to tame excesses reaped at the expense of 
clients, counterparties, and the public interest, what is notably missing 
from the proposed rules is any inclination by the regulators to give 
meaning to this moral imperative.  Although the proposed rulemaking 
faithfully adheres to the text of the Rule, there is a danger that the 
regulatory regime they have created will evolve in a manner that shifts 
 
 148. See supra text accompanying note 108. 
 149. See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88. 
 150. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (2012) (as amended by Section 604 of Dodd–Frank). 
 151. See, e.g., Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68971 (describing 17 C.F.R. § 255.10, 
by which the SEC would delegate its rulemaking authority over investment advisers with respect to 
restrictions on covered fund activities or investments to the appropriate regulatory authority for the 
banking entity with which the investment adviser is affiliated, subject to reservation of enforcement 
authority). 
 152. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States 
Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–67 (2005) (describing the 
difficulties in coordinating rulemaking, supervision, information sharing, and enforcement among the 
federal financial regulators); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 197–206 (2008) (surveying past Executive and Treasury 
regulatory reform efforts). 
 153. Paul Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, Keynote Address 
at the Atlantic’s Economy Summit (Mar. 14, 2012), available at 
http://atlanticlive.theatlantic.com/AtlanticEconomySummit_PaulVolcker_with_ SteveClemons.pdf. 
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the burden of demonstrating noncompliance onto regulators.  For 
regulators that have the resources and expertise to exercise ongoing 
supervision, as well as the discretionary authority over their regulated 
entities required to coerce compliance, such a regulatory framework 
may be appropriate.  For those that lack the resources, political leverage, 
and comparative expertise to monitor the activity of the world’s largest 
financial institutions, it is feckless, particularly if those agencies have 
other regulatory priorities. 
A more vexing danger is that the rules will continue to evolve in a 
manner that focuses on the literal interpretation of the concepts in the 
Rule (e.g., “market making” versus “dealing”).  Such a framework for 
implementation could become so technical that the largest and best 
established financial services providers will exploit the Rule’s 
complexity and the uncertainty to secure a competitive advantage.  In 
such a world, the largest bank holding companies would strengthen their 
monopoly on derivatives dealing, because smaller banking groups 
without the scale or range of activities to cloak their trading activity in 
routine customer businesses are unable to exploit the Rule’s nuances.  
Meanwhile, the residual trading activity by hedge funds and private 
traders would fail to provide end users of financial products with the 
flexibility and efficiency they have come to expect. 
For the Rule to have meaning requires identifying its moral 
imperative and designing a regulatory framework that weaves the Rule’s 
moral imperative into each regulator’s unique brand of regulation.  In 
my view, the Rule’s moral imperative is to link the ability of the major 
financial services providers to reap profits from proprietary trading 
activity—particularly when trading with clients—to the value of the 
services they demonstrably provide to the marketplace.  While a 
discussion of this approach is beyond the scope of this Article,154 a Rule 
focused on such an imperative might work in connection with market 
structure reforms, such as Dodd–Frank’s Title VII regime for swaps and 
security-based swaps, to create a competitive market structure that fills 
the void created by the restrictions on proprietary trading by banking 
organizations, while at the same time providing banking organizations 
with a means to justify that their trading activity in such markets 
satisfies the requirements of the Rule. 
Prohibition came to an end in part through the efforts of reformers 
 
 154. More specifically, I have argued elsewhere that regulators will need to (1) create a critical 
mass of nonbank financial companies to participate in such markets, (2) create mechanisms for nonbank 
financial companies to trade competitively with established banking entities in such markets, and (3) 
establish benchmarks for Volcker Rule compliance that are linked to the competitiveness of such 
markets.  See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule 31–39 (Tulane 
University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 12-15, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097007. 
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who advocated “moderation and restraint” in the use of “intoxicating 
liquors.”155  Whether the Volcker Rule will meet the same fate as the 
Volstead Act will naturally be decided through the political process.  As 
the political wheels turn in the background, regulators can either yield to 
the call of the industry to allow the safe harbors to swallow the Rule, or 
take advantage of the Rule’s mandate to encourage banking entities to 
structure financial markets in a manner that may help achieve the social 
and political ends for which the Rule was enacted.  The approach 
outlined above engages the Dodd–Frank Act holistically from the 
perspective of achieving the “rebalancing of incentives” intended by the 
Rule’s framers. 
  
 
 155. KYVIG, supra note 5, at 122. 
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